From "Trust Me" to "Verify Me" - Tom van den Berg - NDC Copenhagen 2026
The talk details the critical shift in software security from trusting producers to verifying artifacts through cryptographic evidence. Using the SLSA framework as a guide, the speaker demonstrates how build provenance and attestation provide verifiable proof of what was built, how it was built, and that it has not been tampered with. Key tools demonstrated include `cosign` for artifact signing and leveraging OCI registries to store signed artifacts and their associated metadata.
Key takeaways
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Supply Chain Attacks are the New Frontier
2:25
Modern attacks no longer start in application code but in the build pipeline. Examples include the SolarWinds attack (2020) and recent compromises targeting CI secrets via supply chain vulnerabilities.
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Digest-Based Signing is Mandatory
6:10
Relying on tags for artifact signing is dangerous because tags are mutable (can be rewritten). Security must rely on the content digest (SHA-256 hash) to ensure reproducibility and integrity.
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SLSA Framework Guides Verification
14:30
The Open Source Security Foundation's SLSA framework provides a vocabulary of guidelines for securing the entire software development lifecycle, defining requirements for producers and consumers.
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Verification Requires Provenance and Attestation
20:05
Build provenance is verifiable information detailing where, when, and how an artifact was produced. An attestation is a signed statement that verifies claims about the artifact (e.g., confirming successful security scans or build level).
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Security Must Be Automated and Enforced
39:10
To make security actionable, verification must be integrated into CI/CD workflows as a mandatory deployment gate. This includes checking the SLSA build level and verifying all attached attestations.